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Abstract 
Over the years, Nigeria’s heavy dependence on the crude oil as the main source of export earnings has made it 
vulnerable to market vagaries and other conditions associated with international oil politics. The current oil 
slump being experienced may have started taking its toll on Nigeria as the Federal Government has announced 
some austerity measures aimed at cushioning its impact on the economy. Some of the measures announced by 
the Minister of Finance/Coordinating Minister for the economy are payment of tax on luxury goods by Nigerians, 
and reduction in public expenditures and international travels by public servants. Given that price volatility, 
arising mainly from decline in crude oil prices (and production), exacts heavy costs in terms of incomes, 
indebtedness, poverty and development on the country, there is the need to focus on other  revenue sources. 
Using mainly secondary data, this paper examines the prospects of non-oil revenue drive in Nigeria. The paper 
evaluates not just the extent of contemporary fiscal crisis and its effects on socio-economic development in 
Nigeria; it also reviews government policy responses to the crisis; as well as suggesting policy options for 
overcoming the fiscal crisis in Nigeria. The paper concludes that although the contributions of the non-oil sector, 
particularly telecommunications, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant services, 
manufacturing and agriculture, to Nigeria’s economic growth has been tremendous over the past decade, yet the 
economic growth has not reduced poverty nor created jobs as about two thirds of the population lives on less 
than 1 US dollar (USD) per day and the unemployment rate in 2013 was 27.3%. As a major challenge for the 
economy is the dilapidated state of infrastructure and the over-dependence on the oil and gas industry, the paper 
recommends that private sector involvement in infrastructure development and in the development of the non-oil 
sector holds more promise for Nigeria’s economic rejuvenation. 
 
Introduction/Background to the Study 
Developing countries must increase efforts to mobilize domestic  
resources to transform their economies and meet the needs of their  
citizens (UNRISD, Project Brief 1/July 2012). 
The above quotation underscores the need for all the three tiers of government in Nigeria to look 
inward and generate resources to ensure sustainable development and meet the welfare needs of their citizens. 
This becomes imperative especially with the dwindling revenues from the federation account. Nigeria, once a 
major exporter of agricultural commodities, is now a net importer of practically everything owning largely to its 
dependence on the capital-intensive oil-and-gas industry which contributes about 95% of export earnings and 
some 75% of federally-collected revenue derived from the export of crude oil (Akande, et al (2010: 8). Louis 
Chete and Gabriel Falokun (2010:39-40) provide the trend in crude oil dominance from 1961 to 2009. The trend 
reveals a continuous slide in the contribution of the Non-oil export in the period under review (Table1).  
Although Nigeria is universally acknowledged a country well endowed in human and natural resources, yet the 
focus of government since independence has been more on crude oil exploration and exportation to the detriment 
of other economic activities that could bring in the much desired foreign exchange earnings. The reliance on one 
source of economic activity by the country is a carry-over from colonial rule in Africa in which each of the 
colonising countries was made to produce a single cash crop or two, with no attempts made to diversify the 
economic base. But it is uncharitable to blame the colonial government for the development since the imperial 
government left more than five decades ago.  
At independence in 1960, Nigeria’s tax revenue constituted the major source of government revenue. 
The share of tax revenue was 72.6 % in 1962, from where it rose to 81.2% in 1970. Indirect taxes contributed the 
highest proportion of tax revenue in the first decade of independence (import duties being the major component), 
followed by export duties, while excise duties were the least. The share of direct taxes increased from 8.7 % in 
1961 to 28.1% in 1970. The contribution of company income tax rose from 5.4% in 1961 to 13 % in 1968, while 
personal income tax to the federal government was virtually marginal since it was classified under the 
jurisdiction of state government (Bogunjoko, 2004: 83). Between 1970 and 1980, tax yield structure changed 
significantly in favour of direct taxes as the share of direct tax revenue rose from 22.8% in 1970 to 60.1 % in 
1980. Conversely, indirect tax revenue declined from 58.3% to 11.9% during the same period. The shift was 
accounted for by the contribution of petroleum profit tax to direct tax revenue, which increased from 18.5% in 
1970 to 78% in 1980.  
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Table 1: Nigeria: Composition of Exports, 1961-2013 (%) 
Component 1961 1966 1970 1977 1981 1987 1990 2003 2007 2009 
Oil Exports 7.98 23.57 67.0 96.3 98.54 92.1 98.18 98.35 97.91 98.14 
Non-oil exports 92.02 76.43 33.0 3.70 1.46 7.90 1.82 1.65 2.09 1.86 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Louis Chete and Gabriel Falokun (2010:39-40). 
On Thursday 18 December, 2014, Nigerian Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister for the 
Economy, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala tabled a 4.3 trillion naira budget before members of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate at a joint sitting.  The minister estimated  that Nigeria, which produces an average 
of two million barrels of oil daily will earn an average of 65 dollars on each barrel of crude oil. The budget 
details were contained in the “Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Fiscal Strategy (FS) 
document. In spite of this projection however, crude oil prices have continued its downward trend. Two days 
before the budget presentation, on Tuesday, 16 December, the price of oil crashed below 60 dollars per barrel in 
the international market. In fact, the International Brent crude oil price dropped to $59.83 per barrel on Tuesday. 
It used to be about $112 in June this year. It has now gone down by about 50 percent.  
To underscore government frustration on the issue, on 30 September 2014, just about three months 
before, the government had proposed a benchmark of $78 per barrel of crude oil, with an exchange rate of N160 
to a dollar. In other words, the government was estimating that Nigeria in 2015 would earn $78 per barrel of oil 
every day at an exchange rate of N160 to a dollar.  The total budget figure then was 4.8 trillion naira. But when 
oil price began to crash, the government reduced what it calls the “budget benchmark” from  the earlier proposed 
$78 to $73 per barrel, with an exchange rate of N162 to a dollar. The total budget figure in that proposal was 4.7 
trillion naira. As the oil prices continued to fall, on 2 December, the benchmark was reduced to $65 per barrel, 
with an exchange rate of N165 to a dollar for the 2015 fiscal year. That budget was 4.3 trillion naira. With oil 
prices now below $60 per barrel, it is uncertain if that budget is now realistic. 
Although Nigeria has the capacity to produce 2.5mbp, this target is far from being realised as the 
country’s crude oil production has not risen to two million barrels since the first quarter of 2014. This shortage 
has been attributed to crude oil theft, low investment in exploration as a result  of the delay in the passage of the 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and insecurity in the Niger Delta area (The Guardian, 4/12/2014: 1). The minister 
apparently realised this fact when she said that ‘‘though the drop in oil prices was a serious challenge, it was also 
an opportunity for the country to refocus efforts towards the non-oil sectors in preparation for a future with less 
oil revenue”. The foregoing underscores the need for increased domestic-revenue mobilisation from the non-oil 
sector, particularly through value added taxes (VAT) and company income taxes (CIT).  
Over the years, Nigeria’s heavy dependence on the crude oil as the main source of export earnings has 
made it vulnerable to market vagaries and other conditions associated with international oil politics. The current 
oil slump being experienced may have started taking its toll on Nigeria as the Federal Government has 
announced some austerity measures aimed at cushioning its impact on the economy. Some of the measures 
announced by the Minister of Finance/Coordinating Minister for the economy are payment of tax on luxury 
goods by Nigerians, and reduction in public expenditures and international travels by public servants. Given that 
price volatility, arising mainly from decline in crude oil prices (and production), exacts heavy costs in terms of 
incomes, indebtedness, poverty and development on the country, there is the need to focus on other  revenue 
sources. 
 
Statement of Research Problem 
Consistent with the Global Economic Prospects (GEP) 2012 report, which predicted a declining commodity 
prices globally (Businessday, 23/01/2012 pg 17), the current fiscal crisis effectively became pronounced two 
years ago. On Saturday 7 January, 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan announced in a Television broadcast that 
government officials’ salaries, including his own would be cut by 25%. The president also hinted that additional 
expenses such as travel would be reduced to the barest minimum. The simple message is that this is the time 
when austerity measures are needed across every sector of the economy. Across the world, governments 
continue to implement cost-cutting policies needed to weather out the financial recession. For Nigeria, this 
becomes imperative given the persistent fall in global price of its dominant revenue source, the crude oil, and the 
fact that recurrent expenditure (salaries and other expenses) still accounts for about 75% of the budget.  
In 2004, the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission, (RMAFC), as part of its 
mandate, organised a seminar with the theme “Guaranteeing Nigeria’s Future through Diversification of the 
Economy”. Presenting the report of the seminar to the Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, RMAFC Chairman 
Engineer Hamman Tukur said the seminar identified some fundamental problems that have negative 
consequences for economic growth and diversification of the Nigerian economy. Among others, the seminar 
observed that (i) there exists among Nigerians some fundamental attitudes and practices that are not investment-
friendly such as fraud, corruption, dishonesty, lack of transparency in business relations, excessive taste for 
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foreign goods, and poor work attitudes, (ii) there is pervasive fiscal indiscipline at all levels of government with 
the macroeconomic parameters indicating negative signals among which are deficit budgeting, extra-budgetary 
expenditure, high debt overhang, high exchange rates,, double-digit inflation rate, etc (iii) Nigeria is endowed 
with a wide variety of agricultural and industrial raw materials which are too numerous to mention. But how to 
develop and process these natural resources for economic development and welfare of the citizenry remain the 
greatest challenge facing the Nigerian leadership (iv) policies and strategies for the development of local raw 
materials remain largely uncoordinated, resulting in lack of private sector participation, poor funding of research 
institutes, lack of linkages between research institutions and manufacturers and other users and (v) the 
development and utilization of local raw materials is a critical factor in aiding and sustaining industrial growth in 
the country( RMAFC, 2004).   
We are in full agreement with all these observations. Indeed, albeit Nigeria is richly endowed with 
abundant and significant natural resources including solid minerals and agricultural produce yet, many of these 
products are exported in their primary form with no value added prior to exportation. With poor infrastructure, 
particularly, electricity, and finance still posing additional challenges that impede the development and growth of 
these sectors, Nigeria is in dire need of re-focusing and re-strategizing through diversification of the economy to 
non-oil exports. In 2013, a NISER study reports that although economic diversification has featured prominently 
in the Development Plans and broad policy agenda of Nigerian governments since independence, yet after about 
four decades of the diversification efforts, the contribution of primary and secondary sectors to real GDP stands 
at an average of 63 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. Agriculture’s share of GDP has been overriding while 
manufacturing share has remained at single-digit (NISER, 2014). 
Public revenue mobilisation is one of the most keenly contested issues in Nigeria. Scholars (Kayode, 
1993; Emenuga, 1993; Ekpo, 1994; Suberu, 2001; Aiyede, 2009; Oladeji, 2014) have embarked on a 
comprehensive review of the reports of the various commissions and government policies from the 1946 
Phillipson commission to the activities of the National Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(NRMAFC) established in 1989. Essentially, revenue mobilization and allocation among the three tiers of 
government in Nigeria has remained problematic. In the words of Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide (1998. 213), the 
issue of revenue allocation has been a recurring decimal in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. For Obi (1998:262), "the 
issue strikes at the very basis of the existence of the Nigerian federation and the rules of entry and exit from the 
ruling class".  
In virtually all federal systems, including Nigeria, expenditure responsibilities at the sub-national level 
usually exceed the units’ revenue raising capacity, leading to both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. The 
imbalance occurs for various reasons, the most obvious of which is that they arise from the allocation of taxing 
and expenditure responsibilities under the constitution. They could also result from “first move” advantage in 
which while the states may have adequate capacity to raise revenue but may have to share the major sources of 
revenue with the federal government, which has pre-emptively occupied these tax areas (Courchene, et al, 
(2000:105). It was perhaps on the basis of this fact that Phillips (2000) recommended the scrapping of the 
concurrent legislative list for given the federal government an opportunity to institute a take-over of the 
functions meant for the lower tiers and consequently taking over the corresponding financial resources. 
The federal constitutions often lay out the division of revenue responsibilities between national and 
provincial governments. Revenue responsibilities too can evolve over time because of external changes, 
conventions or judicial decisions. The fiscal centralism in Nigeria reflects the fact that Nigeria is ‘the most oil 
dependent of all established federations’, with the centrally controlled oil and gas sector contributing 99% of 
export revenues, 85% of government incomes and 52% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Anderson, 2007:5).  
Nigerian fiscal federalism is characterised by the overwhelming concentration of tax jurisdiction and 
collection at the level of the federal government (Table 2). All the major sources of government revenue-
petroleum profits tax, import duties, excise duties, mining rents and royalties, and companies income tax-are 
controlled by the federal government. State and local governments have jurisdiction only over minor and low-
yielding revenue sources, with the exception of personal income tax at the state-level and property tax at the 
local level. Even at that, the issue of mobilization of these taxes (personal income tax (state) and property tax 
(local) have been problematic. Federal dominance in tax mobilization was such that between 1993 and 1997, 
federally collected revenue amounted to an overwhelming 95.62 percent of total government revenues (Phillips, 
1997:11). During this period, state governments’ tax collection accounted for less than 4 per cent, and local 
governments less than 1 per cent. In this same period, expenditures by state governments averaged about 21 
percent, and by local governments about 7 percent of total government expenditure. Hence, sub-national 
expenditures are largely financed out of federal transfers. This revenue dominance of the federal government not 
only invests the Nigerian federation with instability, but also questions the appropriateness of inter- tier 
distribution of tax jurisdiction (Phillips, 1997: 12) 
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Table 2: Nigeria’s Tax Jurisdiction, 1999 
S /N 
Federal Government State Government Local 
Government 
1 Companies income Tax Personal Income Tax (On 
residents of the state 
Tenement rate 
2 Petroleum Profit Tax Capital gains Tax (on individuals 
only) 
Shops and kiosks rates 
3 Value added Tax Stamp Duties (on Individuals 
Only) 
Liquor Licence  Fee 
4 Education tax ( on companies 
Only) 
Road Taxes e.g. vehicles Only Slaughter slab fee 
5  Capital gains Tax( On co-
corporate bodies and Abuja 
residents) 
Betting and Gaming Taxes Marriage, Birth, and Death 
registration fees 
6 Stamp duties ( on corporate 
bodies ) 
Business Premises and 
registration levies 
Street Name registration fees 
(excluding state capitals) 
7 With-holding tax (on companies) Development levies (Maximum 
of #100 per annum on taxable 
individuals only.) 
Markets/ Motor part fees 
(excluding state-owned 
Markets) 
8 Personal Income Tax (on 
Personnel of the Armed Forces, 
Police, External affairs Ministry 
and residents of Abuja 
Street Naming registration fees 
(State Capital Only) 
Domestic Animal Licence 
Fees 
9 Mining rents and royalties Right of Occupancy fees( State 
Capital Only) 
Bicycles, Trucks, Canoe, 
Wheel barrow, Carts and 
Canoe fees 
10 Customs Duties( i.e Import Duties 
and Export Duties) 
Market Fees (where Markets is 
financed by state Government 
Right of Occupancy fees 
(excluding state Capitals) 
11 Excise Duties Miscellaneous Revenues (e.g. 
Farming from oil states rents on 
Property 
Cattle Tax 
12 Miscellaneous Revenues (e.g. 
farming From Oil states, rents on 
property) 
 Merriment Fees 
13   Radio and TV. Licence fees 
14   Vehicle Parking fees 
15   Public Convenience , sewage 
and refuse disposal fees 
16   Burial Ground and religious 
places permit fees 
17   Signboard and billboard 
advertisement permit fees 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance  
This over-centralized mobilization of revenue has thus given the federal government an undue 
advantage, which remains largely unsatisfactory to the states and local governments.  This is compounded by the 
fact that in Nigeria, the state and local governments have never really had freedom to introduce new taxes. On 
the contrary, they have always lost tax jurisdiction to the federal government, as happened in 1975 when 
Personal Income Tax came under federal legislative jurisdiction; and as happened in 1993 when Sales Tax, 
which was a state tax, was abolished and replaced with VAT which was enacted as a federal tax (Phillips, 1997: 
13). As a way of compensating for this, Nigeria’s federal sub-units, much like their African counterparts in 
Ethiopia and South Africa, receive some 80% or more of their revenues from central transfers as against only 
20% in Canada, 22% in USA, 28% in Switzerland, 31% in Brazil, 51% in Australia and 52% in India (Rodden 
and Wibbels, 2002:804).  
More than any period, Nigeria is facing an acute fiscal crisis. Indeed, all the three tiers of government 
in Nigeria currently face a huge challenge of shortages in revenue, which has resulted from dramatic and 
continuous fall in global crude oil prices from above $147/barrel to below $50/barrel. Expectedly, this revenue 
shortfall has continued to undermine revenue projection and resulted in a reduction of the statutorily revenue 
allocations to the three tiers of government. Naturally, it has also undermined their capacities to execute 
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developmental programmes. All the three tiers of government in Nigeria now face a number of fiscal related 
problems. These include a widening gap between requirements for provision of services and revenue generation; 
precarious dependence on external, especially federal sources of revenue (while the LG relies on state and 
federal government, the state government relies on FG, and the FG relies on the FA). This reliance on exogenous 
sources to execute assigned functions is potentially destabilising just as massive/pervasive property tax evasion 
and sub-optimal tax recovery; and high rate of tax evasion by individual and corporate bodies characterise the 
Nigerian tax system. 
In July 2013 Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala had revealed that the country was losing 
400,000 barrels of crude oil per day to illegal bunkering and vandalism of oil pipelines. According to her, this 
development was part of the reasons why Nigeria’s revenue projection for the 2013 fiscal year was not realized. 
Expectedly, the first implication of the drop in revenue was a decrease in revenue accruing to the three tiers of 
government through the federation account continuously for more than six months in 2013. During the period, 
federation account allocation was augmented with billions of Dollar drawn from the Excess Crude Account 
(ECA).  
In 2012, a former minister of state for finance, Mr. Remi Babalola, had hinted that Federation 
Accounts Allocation Committee (FAAC) might have to consider other options to ease the continued drop in 
revenue into the Federation Account. The new options considered then included: expenditure reduction, non-oil 
revenue enhancement and tolerable deficit/borrowing. These suggestions, hard as they were, were almost 
irresistible and became politically expedient given that in general, governments cannot spend what they do not 
have unless they can borrow or receive assistance from domestic and external sources. However, even for rich 
countries, excessive borrowing can lead to unsustainable debt, which may compromise future growth and well-
being (UNRISD, 2012:1) 
Over the years, drop in revenue accruals to the federation account is always attributable to two main 
issues, one domestic and the other, external. On the domestic front, there was a constant drop of revenue due to 
activities of illegal oil bunkers leading to loss of several thousands of crude oil daily. On the external, there is the 
drastic decline in the price of oil in the international market, with implications for socio-economic development 
especially given that oil proceeds remain the major source of foreign exchange earnings for the country. In the 
light of the foregoing, the following questions are pertinent: what is the magnitude of fiscal crisis in Nigeria?, 
how adequate is the government’s policy response to the crisis?,  what is the prospects of non-oil revenue 
mobilization in Nigeria?, and what policy options are available for Nigeria to overcome the fiscal crisis?. 
 
Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to examine the magnitude of fiscal crisis in Nigeria with a view to 
suggesting policy options towards resolving the crisis. The specific objectives of the study include:  
a. Evaluate the extent of contemporary fiscal crisis and its effects on socio-economic development in 
Nigeria; 
b. Review government policy responses to the crisis;  
c. Examine the prospects of non-oil revenue mobilization in Nigeria; 
d. Suggest policy options for overcoming the fiscal crisis in Nigeria 
 
Methodology 
This study largely derives from my Ph.D thesis as the bulk of materials used is taken from different chapters of 
the thesis. Desk research was therefore employed and secondary data were essentially used. Supplementary data 
were however sourced from library search and archival records. Data generated were content analysed. 
Conceptual Issues 
A fiscal crisis occurs when a government cannot finance its regular activities, including providing social services 
and managing other government functions as a result of unanticipated shortfall in its revenue receipts. 
Essentially, governments in a state of fiscal crisis cannot balance their budgets. They do not take in enough in tax 
revenues to cover their expenses and they cannot raise funds by floating government debt. There are a number of 
ways nations can attempt to address a fiscal crisis and they often involve hardship for many citizens. It is also 
possible for lesser units of governments, like states, provinces, and municipalities, to experience their own fiscal 
crises. These may occur as part of a larger economic problem or an independent issue. 
Non-Oil Revenue 
All revenue types not covered by oil resources are grouped as non-oil revenue. Basically, they include company 
income tax, customs and excise duties, value-added tax, which are the three most important non-oil revenue 
sources. 
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NATURAL RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC UNDERVELOPMENT: THE RESOURCE CURSE 
THESIS 
According to Roberts et al (2013), ‘resource curse’ is a phenomenon that results when an economy relies almost 
exclusively on natural resources. Generally, economists believe that reliance on natural resources has adverse 
consequences for economic growth. In the words of Heston (2003) ‘what has been discovered in the past fifty 
years is that the blessings of natural resources can be a curse in disguise’. The ‘resource curse’ thesis therefore 
posits that there is a negative relationship between endowment with natural resources and social and economic 
development. Alan Gelb (1988) noted that countries that have deposits of natural resources in abundant 
quantities tend to perform worse than those not similarly endowed on virtually every social and economic 
indicator. Indeed, Ross (2001) linked higher mineral and oil dependence to a high level of poverty, 
disproportionate military expenditures by governments and a higher level of authoritarianism. Whenever the 
natural resource governance mechanism fails to function up to speed, a country suffers ‘development in reverse’.  
This is particularly so in federations, where some areas lack natural resources and other areas have resource 
abundance. More importantly, where the central government’s responsibility is mediated and undermined by the 
strong influence of ethnicity and regionalism and where the state does not acquiesce to local demands for 
socioeconomic justice, aggrieved communities tend to resort to militancy (Roberts, et al 2013).  
The ‘resource curse’ thesis tends to validate the theory that the dependence mineral resources is 
particularly injurious to economic growth in that it often leads to indolence in developing other viable economic 
resources. It submits that countries that are resource poor (without petroleum) grew four times more rapidly than 
those that are resource rich. As a matter of fact, Roberts (2010) submits that the extant link between resource 
dependence and conflict derives, not simply from the mere fact that a nation enjoys natural resource endowment 
but more from the manner in which natural resource abundance is most often misgoverned. There is thus the 
issue of bad governance which often results when states are financed from ‘unearned income’ such as is derived 
from large mineral resource, like petroleum, rather than by taxing their citizens (Moore, 2001a). Aiyede (2009: 
251) rightly observes that reliance by sub federal tiers on transfers and grants from central government to finance 
most of their expenditure tends to create incentive for these levels of governments to inflate expenditure and 
engage in perennial negotiations with central government to attract more grants and transfers. This behaviour has 
entrenched free riding on the part of political elites at sub national level, who are more inclined towards the 
often-cited ‘cake sharing’, rather than ‘cake baking’, and are therefore labeled ‘consumerist federalists’ 
especially in a context where central funds are mainly derived from the exploitation of natural resources largely 
collected by the federal government. 
The discovery of oil in Nigeria has been particularly baneful as it re-focused distributive conflicts 
around a single source of revenue, namely federally-collected petroleum export rents (Suberu, 1999:35). From 
this period, there is excessive centralization of power and resources in manner which has been described a 
‘system of unitary federalism’ (Suberu, 2008a:34). Again, unitary absolutism in the political scene has been 
complemented by unitarism in the economic sphere since 1966. Thus, by the petroleum Decree (No. 51) of 1969, 
the Federal Military Government declared that the entire ownership and control of all petroleum resources in, 
under or upon any lands in Nigeria was vested in itself (Sagay, 2001). Disappointingly, new orientations, 
permutations and intrigues were introduced into the Nigerian revenue allocation policies. Majority groups in 
government commenced the process of reversal of the basis of revenue allocation with regard to petroleum 
resources, from derivation to Federal Government exclusive ownership. 
More specifically, since 1975, the military government effected fundamental changes in the country’s 
tax jurisdiction. Apart from appropriating virtually all buoyant sources of state revenues, the federal military 
government enacted a number of decrees that tended to make nonsense of the doctrine of federalism in Nigeria. 
The period also heralded intense contestations from the people of Niger Delta who have continued to demand 
adequate compensation through acceptable revenue allocation scheme. It is instructive that the period between 
1966 and 1979, a period of 13 years of unbroken authoritarian rule, witnessed significant economic, social and 
political changes, with far reaching implications on the system of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. Three 
of the implications of the numerous changes occasioned by developments during this period bare enumeration. 
These are (1) the fact that government expenditures and revenue patterns were affected by the three-year civil 
war (1967-1970); (2) the fact that the form of government was further decentralized by the creation of additional 
states out of the erstwhile regions/states, with implications on the ability of these states to operate as autonomous 
entities and (3) finally, the creation of additional local governments, and recognitions of these local governments 
as the third tier of government. All of these developments have had tremendous impact on the future 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria. 
Certain problems are normally associated with such a huge dependence on oil revenues. They include: 
• Problem of political accountability because the federal government raises its revenues from such a 
narrow base and most states contribute very little to national or their own revenues.  Only 6 of Nigeria’s 
36 states produce petroleum, with 4 being the most important.  Thus the large majority of states turn to 
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the federal government for the vast majority of their revenues and most of those revenues are 
effectively collected in other parts of the country.  The public, for its part, pays little of the cost of 
government programmes.  
• It can be a source of major tensions between the producing and other regions of the country. The cry for 
resource control particularly between 1999 and 2006 is in this line. 
• It appears to have led to an underdevelopment of alternative revenue sources because it is easier to tax 
oil than citizens.  This has longer-term implications for the economy. 
• It creates problems of stability in public finances tied to a resource whose value swings widely and that 
will deplete over time.  This poses short-term issues about the central government's ability to manage 
cyclical pressures on the economy as well as longer-term issues about the sustainable level of public 
services. This issue has led a number of countries having it difficult to stabilize financially. Russia is 
probably the best federal example to be very aggressive in developing revenue stabilization funds. 
 
Comparative Perspective 
The current economic meltdown appears to be global in spread. Coming under its bite, Venezuela, another 
OPEC member country, has gone into austerity measures just as many other countries that are completely 
dependent on oil. Angola, Algeria, Iran are all under duress as Nigeria because oil price slump has affected their 
budgetary benchmark. Non- OPEC countries like Russia are not spared either as they already seeing a drop in the 
value of their rubble.  
One of the reasons for the difficulty facing Nigeria is the increase in the U.S production of shale oil 
and gas. By the year 2000, shale gas was 2% of the U.S. natural gas supply; by year 2012, it was 37%. 
According to Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. has 300 trillion cubic feet of gas in proven 
reserves and potentially ten times that amount in unproven reserves, much of which is in shale deposits. By 
comparism, the U.S. currently consumes about 25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas annually. If current trends 
continue, EIA estimates that the U.S will be producing more gas than it consumes within the next seven years. 
The U.S has stopped importation of oil from Nigeria since July, 2014. At its peak (in February 2006), the U.S 
imported 1.3 million barrels per day from Nigeria. By 2012, Nigeria was selling only 0.5 million barrels per day, 
but was still one of the top five suppliers to the U.S. In early 2014, this tailed off to around 100,000 barrels per 
day and, in July 2014, Nigeria oil exports to the U.S stopped completely. Despite the stoppage of Nigeria crude 
oil to the U.S, Nigerian OPEC production has not dropped as four Asian countries have expanded their Nigerian 
purchases. China, India, Japan and South Korea, have been responsible for the consumption of about 42% of 
Nigeria’ crude oil export in the first eight months of 2014. The biggest of all was India which imported Nigeria 
oil during January-August 2014 by 37% on an average of about 367,000 barrels per day. 
Another problem with the increased supply of U.S shale oil is also the type of oil required. The high-
grade, low-sulphur ‘sweet’ crudes of Nigeria are very similar to the oil produced in the U.S shale oil extraction. 
When these U.s shale oils reach the world market as a result of increased U.S exports of crude, this will have a 
major impact on reducing the premia charged by Nigeria for its sweet crudes. This reduction of the premia, in 
addition to the reduction in the price of crude oil in general, hovering around the US$80 per barrel mark, is 
making Nigerian crude uneconomic. The Nigerian costs of production are relatively high as there are ‘social 
costs’ which must be added to the costs of extraction and transport. This ancillary ‘social costs’ include the loss 
of almost 150,000 barrels per day of oil(7%) which is stolen from the system. This ‘bunkering’ of oil is the 
organised thievery of oil from pipelines and in transit which are taken away to other countries for sale; often 
smuggled by tankers across the borders or shipped in small vessels to refineries like those in Abidjan, where the 
crudes are refined.  
The inability of Nigeria to refine most of its crude locally is perhaps the greatest problem contributory 
to its economic crisis. The refining capacity of Nigeria constitutes a national disaster as there is almost a total 
failure of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in terms of refining capacity. Nigeria’s 
theoretical total refining capacity is 445,000 barrels per day in local refineries installed in three stages between 
1965 and 1989. A modest capacity of 35,000 bpd was installed in Port Harcourt in 1965 amid the political 
turmoil which led to the Biafra war in 1966. This was expanded to 60,000 bpd in 1971 preparing for the post-war 
oil-led economic boom. This was the period that saw an eight-fold crude production increase from 1969 to 1974. 
Warri and Kaduna refineries were commissioned eight to nine years after with capacities of 125,000bpd and 
110,000 bpd respectively, coinciding with the 1979/80 upstream production peak. Production was again on the 
upsurge when the most modern of the three refineries was commissioned in Port-Harcourt in 1989 with a 
capacity of 150,000 bpd. Despite all these, Nigeria still relies heavily on imported refined crude.  
 
THE POLITICS OF NON-OIL REVENUE DRIVE IN NIGERIA 
In most federal states, allocation of governmental responsibilities and revenue for accomplishing them often 
remains a critical process because the division of powers and functions is usually associated with critical 
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imbalance in fiscal terms. Thus, federal political systems are usually confronted with the challenge of the 
effective management of fiscal imbalance1, the process which may either be formal or informal2, direct or 
clumsy.   
Essentially, the first political issue to be addressed in resource mobilization, especially in a complex 
and highly divisive society as Nigeria is that of the centralised system of federalism in Nigeria, which has 
constituted a veritable source of, rather than a credible solvent for, the country's multifaceted crises of unity, 
democracy, and development. Suberu (2010) observes that contemporary debates about Nigeria's political and 
socio-economic failures have routinely implicated the presumed pathologies, incongruities and liabilities of the 
country's federalism. For much of the period of self rule, revenue allocation among the three tiers of government 
in Nigeria has remained problematic3. In the words of Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide4, the issue has been a recurring 
decimal in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. Thus, despite over a dozen attempts, including the establishment of nine 
(9) different ad hoc revenue allocation commissions, and a permanent technical fiscal commission-the Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC)-the sharing of revenue still remains very volatile and 
sensitive in Nigeria.  While it may be possible that the long period of military rule in Nigeria may be 
contributory to the country’s difficulty in evolving acceptable revenue sharing system, it was expected that civil 
rule which returned in May, 1999 would have liberalized the institutional framework for inter governmental 
sharing of revenues and responsibilities (Oladeji, 2014). 
In the main, the discordance between fiscal capacity of the various levels of government, and their 
expenditure responsibilities, that is, the non correspondence problem5, is a striking feature of the Nigerian 
federal finance6.  This remains so because, essentially there exists a growing mismatch between mandates and 
resources among the three tiers, particularly the lower tiers, namely the states and local governments which 
complain about federal preponderance in fiscal matters as well as the stifling of these lower tiers due largely to 
inadequate resources to execute constitutionally stipulated functions. 
A critical element of Nigeria's fiscal arrangements is the principle of derivation.  In fact, it is the only 
criterion for distribution from the Federation Account where the amount currently 13 per cent of oil revenues is 
set in the Constitution.  Interestingly, there have been conflicting regional positions on the issue of resource 
control in Nigeria with the northern region consistently opposing the agitations for ‘true’ federalism in which 
resource control is embedded. In the main, northern opposition to resource control is based on the argument that 
before the discovery of petroleum resources, Nigeria and Nigerians depended on the proceeds from agricultural 
produce of the northern and western regions. It was also argued that it was part of the proceeds from agricultural 
produce exportation that was utilised for the development of the petroleum industry (Sani, 2001:4) 
Indeed, the issue of resource control has been historically controversial in Nigeria. The principle of 
derivation as a criterion of horizontal revenue allocation in Nigeria was first recommended by the Phillipson 
Fiscal Commission of 1946. According to that principle, each region making up the Federation then received 
from the Central Government in proportion to its contribution to the centrally collected revenue. For example, 
revenue derived from import and excise taxes on tobacco, import duties on motor fuel, salt, spirit as well as 
export duties and mining rents and royalties were shared on the basis of derivation/consumption of the affected 
products. Thus the principle of derivation featured prominently such that between 1946 and 1959 the applicable 
percentage was 100 percent while between 1960 and 1964, it was 50 percent. In the words of Attah (2001), 
despite the fact that there were dissenting voices against such high percentage for derivation, the principle was 
fully accepted and fully applicable up till 1967 when oil became the major contributor to the revenue pool.  
As already alluded to, federations vary in terms of who owns natural resources.  But in several 
federations (including the USA, Australia and Canada) there are significant revenues associated with the 
offshore oil and other natural resources owned by the federal government. Indeed, empirically, all successful 
federations-USA, Sweden, Australia, Canada, etc- are operated on the basis of resource control/principle of 
derivation. This situation also holds in federations where, due to geographical distribution of natural resources, 
                                                 
1  Courchene, Thomas et al (2000) “Principles of Decentralization” in Achievements and Challenges of Fiscal 
Decentralization: Lesson From Mexico, eds. Marcelo M. Giugale, and Steven B. Webb, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
2 Boothe, Paul (2003) “Introduction” in Fiscal Relations in Federal Countries: Four Essays, edited by Paul Boothe, Ottawa: 
Forum of Federations. 
3 Oladeji, Abubakar (2005:5) Federalism and the Political Economy of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria, NISER monograph 
series No 2, Ibadan: NISER 
4 Mbanefoh Gini F. and Egwaikhide, Festus O. (1998) “Revenue Allocation in Nigeria. Derivation Principle Revisited” in 
Kunle Amowo et al (edited) Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan. Spectrum Books Limited 
5 Adedeji  A (1969) traces the origin of this problem to the first republic (1960-66) . He observes that there was invariably 
little correspondence between the assignment of different responsibilities and duties to the federal and regional authorities 
and their financial resources. 
6 Mbanefoh Gini F. and Egwaikhide, Festus O. (1998) “Revenue Allocation in Nigeria. Derivation Principle Revisited” in 
Kunle Amowo et al (edited) Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan. Spectrum Books Limited 
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some federating units are richer while others are poorer, such as in Canada where the very rich Ontario and 
Quebec still co-exist with less endowed federating units.  
There are a preponderance of issues relating to Nigeria’s Federal-State Relations, and in particular, its fiscal 
federalism. The main issues are as follows: 
 The discordance between fiscal capacities of the various levels of government, and their expenditure 
responsibilities, that is, the non correspondence problem. In Nigeria’s fiscal federalism, large revenue-yielding 
tax heads such as petroleum profit tax, personal income tax, and customs and excise duties are assigned to the 
centre, while responsibilities for delivering public services over a wide area are assigned to the lower tiers. By 
virtue of allocation of responsibilities in the Legislative lists in the 1999 constitution, the federal government is 
very strong and powerful as it holds all the power in the Exclusive List of the constitution. On the Exclusive List, 
there are 68 items on which only the federal government can exercise power. On the Concurrent List, there are 
30 items. But even on this Concurrent List, the state governments cannot exercise power on any item except with 
the permission of the federal government. This is the basis upon which it is asserted that there is the prevalence 
of fiscal centralism in Nigeria. It is contended that the federal government has gradually taken over functions and 
resources for which the lower tiers are constitutionally mandated to perform. 
 Inequitable distribution of natural resources and the over-politicization of the allocation of national wealth. The 
inequitable distribution of natural resources and the over-politicization of the allocation add to the conflictual 
relationship and intense scheming among the stakeholders as to how the available resources could be shared in a 
way that is acceptable to the majority. The sub federal units, namely the 36 state and 774 local governments have 
continued to complain that not just is the revenue allocation framework too lopsided and centralist to ensure 
equitable allocation, that they also are seriously shortchanged on the issue of  what mandates are expected of 
them, given the paucity of resources. This refers to vertical equity in fiscal federalism parlance. The history of 
Nigeria’s experience with federalism is as old as that of fiscal-related contestations, with most of the issues 
(revenue allocation formula; resource control/derivation; local government creation; etc) dragging to the apex 
court for adjudication. 
There are four principal revenue bases in Nigeria.  Three are federal: (i) oil and gas royalties, licenses 
and fees; (ii) corporate income tax; and (iii) the VAT.  One is state: the personal income tax. Experience in other 
federations around the assignment of these revenue bases varies a good deal.  Personal and corporate income 
taxes are typically either exclusively federal or shared.  Nigeria is perhaps the only known federation that has 
assigned personal income taxes exclusively to the states.  VAT and sales taxes are also usually 
exclusively  federal or shared. Revenues from oil and gas can come from royalties, licence fees, profits from 
state oil companies, and export taxes (as well as indirectly from corporate taxes) (Table 1).  Royalties and 
licence fees are associated with ownership of the resource and are typically the major source of revenue from oil 
and gas.  In the older federations, such as the USA, Canada and Australia, onshore resource ownership is 
normally with the states, though there are substantial 'federal lands' in the Western states of the US and in 
Alaska.   
Table 3: Major Revenue-Collecting Agencies and Types of Revenues Collected  
Revenue 
Agency 
Type of Revenue Collected 
NNPC ♦ Export Crude Sales 
♦ Domestic Crude Sales  
♦ LPG 
♦ NLNG. 
FIRS ♦ Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT)  
♦ Company Income Tax (CIT)  
♦ Withholding Tax (WHT) 
NCS  ♦ Import Duty 
♦ Excise Duty 
♦ Fees   
DPR ♦ Royalties 
♦ Gas Flared  
♦ Rental   
♦ Miscellaneous Oil Revenues such as oil Prospecting License, Oil 
Mining License and Lease currently not being paid into the 
Federation Account 
Source: Oladeji, 2014 
Perhaps the most recurrent problem of Nigeria’s three-tier system of fiscal federalism is over-
dependence of all tiers of government on revenues allocated from the federation account for more than 80 per 
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cent of their expenditure. This is the result of poor, uncertain, and at times ambiguous revenue generation system. 
With dwindling revenue from this main source, the problems become pronounced. Essentially, developments 
since the onset of military rule in Nigeria could be described using concentration process as canvassed by 
Mbanefoh (1986:6).  Citing Peacock and Wiseman (1961: 29-30), Mbanefoh (1986:7) distinguished four ways in 
which the concentration process may affect the division of governmental functions and resources between higher 
and lower levels of government: 
1. By higher level of government taking greater share of responsibility for expanding types of government 
expenditure; 
2. By shifting responsibility for particular services from lower to higher authorities; 
3. By lower authorities losing effective autonomy as they become more dependent on higher authority as a 
source of revenue ( either as a result of a loss of their tax base or failure of their taxes to share in the 
general expansion of government revenue) 
4. By the creation of new authorities under the broad control of federal authority to deal with special 
problems. 
It is instructive that all the above four  causes/variants of  concentration process easily apply to Nigeria, 
and collectively they explain why since January 1966, when military rule started in Nigeria, there has been 
increasing fiscal centralization and  why the lower tiers, namely the states and local government councils have 
become increasingly more dependent on the centre. Effectively, the federal military government did not just take 
greater share of responsibility for expanding types of government expenditure; it also stripped state governments 
of their power over some major sources of independent revenue. It also unilaterally usurped a number of 
functions formerly performed by the states, without any opposition from them (Mbanefoh, 1986:16).  
Revenue allocation based on derivation was practiced in Nigeria form 1950s to 1967 when the twelve 
states federal structure was created. The reason for aborting this principle according to the federal government 
was to allow for even development of the twelve states. Rather than develop locally based resources; most of the 
states now wait for largesse from the federal government in the name of allocation from oil revenue (Ige, 1995). 
Thus, the present state of fiscal federalism stifled local initiative, promote inefficiency and fostered a sense of 
overdependence on the federal government (Olukoshi, 1991). Indeed, it has created a system that discouraged 
work by having booty capitalism which is shared every month. Adherents of federalism asserts that this  
paternalistic form of  federalism does not sustain development as it rather encourages crisis and conflict as 
manifested in the Niger Delta. 
The period 1960-66 remains the main pillars of fiscal federalism in Nigeria till date. However, it also 
coincided with and contained the product of post independence politics, as efforts were made by the powers that 
be to reduce the earlier emphasis on regional financial independence based on the principle of derivation. It was 
argued that the financial stability of the federal government was necessary for the stability of the regions. 
Following from this, the 1960/63 constitutions provided for 50 percent derivation in respect of revenues from all 
minerals. It was in this phase also that the Distributable Pool Account (the forerunner of today’s Federation 
Account) was instituted. Specified tax proceeds collected by the federal government was paid into this account 
and then distributed to the regions based on the following criteria: (1) continuity in government services; (2) 
minimum responsibilities of each government; (3) need based on population size of the region; and (4) the 
balanced development of the federation. 
The point being made is that the revenue allocation formula in use during the first republic in Nigeria 
made the regions very strong financially and politically. This is because, since the principle of derivation was 
assigned a very high weight, the regions knew that their revenue fortunes depended on their ability to initiate 
programmes which would bring them more revenue. Thus, not only were the regions very competitive in 
revenue generation, they were eventually highly financially and politically strong. This indeed informs the 
assertion that the practice of federalism in Nigeria’s first republic was competitive and developmental.  
This appears a good starting point because empirically, all old and successful federations like America, 
Sweden, Australia or Canada are operated on the basis of local resource control, in which mechanisms are 
devised to return a sizeable proportion of revenues to states/regions of origin. Even in federations where, because 
of geographical distribution of natural resources, some federating units are richer while others are poorer, the 
principle is still upheld so as to sustain lasting association. In Canada for instance, the provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec still co-exist without experiencing frustrating threats or animosity from the relatively less endowed 
provinces. In Colombia, oil production is located in only two provinces; the Siberian oblast of Tyumen produces 
almost two-thirds of total Russian oil; and in Argentina a single province, Neuquen, produces more than one-
thirds of total oil output ( Brosio, 2003:249-50). It must be stated however that, when oil rents are assigned 
exclusively to sub national governments, they tend to produce vast horizontal imbalances that is extremely large 
disparities in per capital revenues of sub national units as in the case of Alaska. But on equity and efficiency 
grounds, producing areas have to be compensated for exploitation and production costs (Brosio, 2003:252) and 
for externalities, which are inevitable consequences of natural resource mobilization. Fortunately, the Nigerian 
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case presents an interesting scenario in which virtually all the 36 states have one form of natural resources or 
another (Oladeji, 2005:81-83). What is lacking though is the political will to develop these resources. 
It is instructive that since the discovery of oil in the 1970s, the Nigerian economy has become largely 
monocultural and oil-centric, indicating that all other potential sources of national resources have been 
downplayed. In Nigeria, the dependency on oil and the resultant distortion of the economy have continued to 
produce what economists call the “Dutch Disease”, whereby the oil and gas export boom has led to the exchange 
rate being over valued, the local industry and agriculture becoming uncompetitive and the economy being 
increasingly dependent on imports. This would continue to have negative implications on the development 
aspirations of the country in years to come. It also confirms the assertion that Nigeria is a rentier1 state (Heinrich 
Boll Foundation Nigeria in www.boellnigeria.org/index.intml). Indeed, the rentier notion refers to the sharing of 
a produce or natural stock of wealth without contributing to it. 
Given the over-reliance of the economy on petrol-dollar resource, the Nigerian federalism becomes 
highly centralized, and so is revenue mobilization and allocation in the country. This tendency towards fiscal 
centralism featured slightly since the time of independence in 1960 and reached a peak during the military era 
between 1984 and 1998 (Anugwom, 2005: 98). In between this period, the discovery of oil, and its impact on the 
centralization of the entire system of revenue mobilization and allocation was considerable. This caused 
considerable distortions in the vertical revenue allocation system and left the sub federal tiers in a state of 
perpetual financial squeeze (ibid). In other words, the contemporary perennial, and in most cases, conflict-ridden 
relationship between the Federal and State Governments over revenue allocation is indicative of how the country 
has deviated from the original idea of federalism (Achebe, 1983).  
Main Findings 
Origin of the fiscal crisis 
The fiscal crisis currently being experienced in Nigeria is as a result of continuous downward slide in the global 
prices of crude oil, which is Nigeria’s dominant revenue source.  For about five years, total receipts of the 
federation account has been nose-diving with implications for attainment of governmental goals This makes the 
diversification of sources of revenue imperative. Given that crude oil constitutes Nigeria’s largest revenue source, 
the problem is better imagined. More worrisome is the fact that both oil and non-oil components of revenue are 
similarly affected by the decline, making it difficult for revenue targets in the budgets over a five year period to 
be accomplished. For instance, the trend in non-oil performance over the period 2005 to 2010 is worrisome. In 
this 6-year period, the actual gross non-oil revenue was N396.07 billion revealing an underperformance of 
N84.51 billion (or 17.58%) below the projected quarterly estimate of N480.58 billion. The breakdown of the 
Non-Oil revenue item shows that all the items had negative variances. Also, in the current year, the federal 
government recorded a decline of N329.79 in gross non-oil revenue receipts in the first six months of 2014 to 
N1.08 trillion from the half year estimate of N1.48 trillion. In the same vein, the country witnessed a free fall of 
its gross oil revenue between June and October 2014 as it plunged by N132.5 billion. The estimated receipts was 
N602.5 billion, while the actual; receipt was N470.0 billion.    
Government Policy Response 
The immediate government response to the fiscal crisis was to declare an austerity measure, including the 
freezing of foreign travels for civil servants, slashing of the budget oil benchmark, drop in capital projects 
financing, and payment of tax on luxury goods (such as private jets, expensive cars, yachts, champagne, etc). 
Another measure declared by government was the decision to increase internal revenue generation from N75 
billion in the current year to N160 billion in 2015, with a focus on non-oil revenue. Although this shift in sources 
of revenue is commended, there is the palpable fear that the poor may be worse for it through the imposition of a 
multiplicity of taxes and rates by the various levels of government. Fiscal policies to cut down spending on 
wastages, luxury goods and conspicuous consumption are not new in Nigeria as the word ‘austerity’ was a 
household name in the early 1980s when the economy experienced similar recession.  
Other measures include full implementation of the provision of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007 
relating to MDAs’ timely remittance of their operating surpluses and other Internally Generated Revenue to the 
Treasury. This becomes imperative given that a major problem of Intergovernmental relations in Nigeria is non-
compliance with constitutional provision not just on payment into and disbursement from the federation account, 
but also on recommendations relating to fiscal adjustment. There is, indeed, deliberate manipulation of rules of 
engagement and under-reporting and at times, outright non-remittance of revenues (Oladeji, 2014). This issue of 
non-remittance and underpayment of revenues to the federation account have continued to generate controversies 
and tensions among tiers of government in Nigeria, and it suggests that nature and character of institutions 
matter not just for economic development, but also for political stability. One of the implications of departures 
                                                 
1 A rentier state is a state whose major source of revenue does not arise from taxation on productive activities such as 
agriculture, industry, services, etc undertaken by its economically active population. Instead, the rentier state lives by 
collecting a convenient income from sources into which it invests little or nothing. 
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from constitutional provisions regarding the payment into and disbursement from federation account is that 
states and local government councils receive revenues far below what they should otherwise receive.  
Again, government has taken steps to strengthen the capacities both in the MDAs and in the revenue 
generating and collecting agencies to improve their budget implementation through training. Other areas include 
a more intensive engagement with revenue generating Agencies and a process audit of their operations. These 
efforts are expected to have a positive impact on MDAs’ performances in revenue collections. 
The Federal Government (FG) has continued to implement policies aimed at reviving the ailing 
economy. These reforms especially in the telecommunications, oil and gas, aviation, banking and insurance and 
water transport together with rebalancing of the economy toward services and domestic market development 
contributed in no small measure towards the remarkable growth recorded in gross domestic product (GDP). 
Some policy initiatives designed to enhance the performance of the manufacturing sector include introduction of 
a number of tax incentives, comprising: (i) the granting of a pioneer status to export producing enterprises, which 
opened a new shop or expanded existing facilities; (ii) tax holiday from income tax up to five years, (iii) a tax 
credit of 20% of cost for a period of five years to engineering companies which use a minimum of 60% locally 
sourced raw materials for production, and (iv) tax exemption on dividends from small companies in the 
manufacturing sector in the first five years of their operation. There were also policy interventions in rice mills 
and bakery with various tariff incentive measures to boost local production of processed rice and cassava bread.  
Towards the end of the fourth quarter of 2010 the FG decided to further liberalize trading activities in 
the country. This was carried out through the review of the import prohibition list.  The exercise which was 
aimed at increasing government’s non-oil revenue was criticized by operators in the industrial sector. The 
implication of the trade liberalization policy was that there would be a boost in the wholesale/retail trade 
activities as more items would be allowed to be imported into the country in 2011. In addition, this policy would 
also increase water transport operations at the nation’s seaports. However, the impact of policy may adversely 
affect activities in the manufacturing sector. 
The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) in collaboration with other relevant stakeholders in 
the telecommunications sector have continued to make the sector very vibrant and investor friendly by ensuring 
quality and efficient service delivery. In 2010, the sector recorded significant improvement over its level in 2009 
with tele-density soaring above 60% against 53% recorded in 2009.  
Government also continued the institutional support measures implemented in 2010 and 2011 targeted 
at addressing the challenges of rising cost of food, improving access to credit by farmers, promoting commercial 
agriculture, encouraging bio-fuel production as well as achieving the minimum sectoral growth target of 10.0 per 
cent as enunciated in the NV 20: 2020 document.  Finance has been identified as a critical constraint inhibiting 
development of the agricultural sector.  To ameliorate this challenge, the various agricultural financing schemes 
which were initiated since 2011 (including the Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme (CACS) were sustained.  
The CACS is aimed at providing funds through credit schemes to commercial agricultural enterprises at a single 
digit interest rate to improve agricultural production and diversify the revenue base of the economy as well as 
provide inputs for the industrial sector on a sustainable basis. 
Again, through the Rural Finance Institution Building Programme (RUFIN), government is enhancing 
the capacity of rural financial institutions in providing resources to meet the credit requirements of the rural farm 
communities.  The programme commenced in 12 selected states through a loan of US$27.2 million from IFAD, 
a grant of US$0.5 million from the Ford Foundation and counterpart funding from the Federal Government and 
the participating states. The policy of Guaranteed Minimum Price (GMP) was sustained during the period under 
review so as to protect farmers from the effects of produce price volatility.  Under the scheme, buying agents 
were selected and registered to purchase food items at GMP for storage in the National Food Reserves.  The 
deregulation of fertilizer supply and expansion of irrigation infrastructure also continued to be accorded high 
priority.  During the first half of 2011, government continued its involvement in the supply of fertilizers by 
instituting an effective monitoring and quality assurance framework to ensure that fertilizers get to the intended 
beneficiaries. In addition, the inter-Ministrial Committee on Trade that was established since 2010 continued to 
create awareness on the potentials of cocoa production, processsing, warehousing and export. 
Industrial Policy and Institutional Support-The government intensified efforts to provide the 
infrastructural backbone across the country in order to improve industrial and economic activities.  This involved 
the reform of the power  sector in terms of the upgrading, expansion and rebailitation of existing power 
transmission and distribution infrastructure.  The Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Authority (NERC) also 
commenced the implementation of the Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) as an appropriate tariff model for 
effective pricing to encourage investment in the sector. 
Reform of the Tax System-The tax system has been reformed through measures including the 
restructuring of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) to improve revenue collection, broaden the tax base 
and address tax evasion and avoidance. Efforts have also been made to strengthen interagency co-ordination on 
revenue collection as well as to simplify and harmonise tax procedures. The auditing powers of the FIRS have 
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also been strengthened, and in 2007, a tax-policy unit was also set up in the Ministry of Finance to oversee some 
of these changes.  
In 2010, the government conducted a review of the Import Prohibition List and Tariff Structure in light 
of existing best practices in order to assess the impact of these prohibitions on government revenue and on local 
industry. Several measures were pursued in 2010 to block revenue leakages. These included a forensic audit of 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and process audits of internally generated remittances 
from ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). The government also required MDAs and parastatals to 
submit their revenue and expenditure estimates. It has enhanced these measures in 2011 by issuing the directive 
to more than 32 parastatals – including the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), the Federal Inland Revenue Service and other revenue-generating agencies – to submit their 
budget to the National Assembly, in line with the provision of the Constitution and the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
These policy measures have contributed to improving domestic-revenue mobilisation. In 2009, tax revenue rose 
to 6.9% of GDP and is estimated to have remained stable at about 6.4% of GDP in 2010.  
Sources of Growth of the Economy-  Analysis of growth drivers by broad sectoral category shows that 
the robust growth of the economy in 2012 was supported by agriculture, industry and services (Figure 1).  
Services sector with 19 sub-sectors contributed 4.37 percentage points, or 66.14% to overall growth of the real 
GDP, largely due to robust growth of telecommunications and wholesale and retail trade. Agriculture, which is 
the second largest contributor to overall growth of the economy contributed 24.52% to the overall growth of the 
economy and the growth was largely led crop production. Industrial sector, which is made up of 10 sub-sectors 
of the economy contributed 0.62 percentage points, or 9.35% to the overall growth of the economy. The 
contribution of the industrial sector was driven largely and directly by building and construction, manufacturing 
and electricity. Poor performance of crude petroleum and natural gas mitigated the pace of growth of the 
economy and was responsible to the low contribution of the industrial sector to the overall growth of the 
economy. 
Figure 1: Growth Drivers by Broad Sector Category in 2012 
 
Source: NPC 
Telecommunications sector emerged the second largest growth driver of the Nigerian real GDP with a 
growth rate of 32.11% and contributed 27.37% of the overall growth rate of GDP in 2012. Wholesale and retail 
trade was the high largest driver of growth, with the contribution of 27.78% to the overall growth of the 
economy. The growth of wholesale and retail trade was 9.48% in 2012. The third largest sector, following 
behind wholesale and retail trade and telecommunications, was agriculture with a contribution of 24.52% to the 
economy-wide growth and a growth of 4.03% in 2012. There is need for government to intensify efforts to 
ensure the sectors are given maximum support to accelerate growth of the economy and to enhance their inter-
sectoral linkages for quick economic development of the country. 
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Figure 2: The Three Major Drivers of the Economy in 2012 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
Small industrial Base 
The base of the industrial sector in the Nigerian economy remains small and declining as against the expectation 
for the sector. The share of industry in real GDP in 2011 declined from 24.43%  to 23.49% in 2012, due to the 
decline in share of crude petroleum and natural gas from 14.8% in 2011 to 13.78% in 2012. The share of 
agriculture in real GDP also declined but remained more broad-based compared with any other sector. The share 
of agriculture in real GDP decreased from 40.19% in 2011 to 39.22% in 2012, with reduction in the contribution 
of agriculture to real GDP led by crop production. The services sector has benefited from the growth transition in 
the economy in recent years, with its share in real GDP increasing from 35.38% in 2011 to 37.29% in 2012 
(Figure 4). As in previous year, the services sector accounted for the largest share of real GDP in Q1 2014, 
amounting to N8, 181, 239.94 million or 52.99%. Industry ranked second with a contribution of N4, 223,469.13 
million or 27.36%, while Agriculture constituted the smallest sector in the first quarter, representing N3, 
033,970.43 million or 19.65%. With respect to sectoral growth, the services sector recorded a growth rate of 
7.20% during the first quarter of 2014, followed by Agriculture at 5.53% and industry at 4.84% (NBS, issue 01, 
Q1, 2014) (Figure 3). Wholesale and retail trade, and telecommunications are the main drivers of the growth of 
the services sector. 
Figure 3: Sectoral Contribution to GDP, Q1, 2014 
 
 
 Dominance of Oil Revenues 
Oil revenues still remained dominant as a component of revenue in Nigeria, year in year out. This is reflected in 
Figure 4 below. The development reflected the shift in revenue generation of the government since crude oil was 
discovered in the late 1950s. The oil and gas industry has continued to grow in capacity and its role in Nigeria’s 
economic and national development. From a modest production of 5,000 barrels per day (bpd)  in 1958 to over 
2.5 million bpd in 2005, the industry’s role in national development has continued to grow to the point that it is 
now the backbone of Nigeria’s national and economic development (Egbogah, 2010: 309).  
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Source: Derived from NBS Trade Statistics  
 
 
Weak Institutional Architecture 
The institutional architecture of revenue mobilization and allocation in Nigeria is weak, ineffective and is yet to 
produce a revenue allocation formula that is balanced and widely accepted. Different institutional arrangements 
have produced varying revenue allocation formulae. Although permanent institutions are preferable to ad-hoc 
revenue arrangements, yet RMAFC and FAAC operate more as political than technical bodies, and are yet to 
establish reputation for independence. Although, like India and Australia, RMAFC members are appointed by 
the federal government after consultation with States, yet unlike in these countries where commissions’ 
recommendations carry great weight and usually adopted virtually intact, RMAFC is yet to establish a reputation 
for independence, even as its recommendations have often been subjected to unilateral federal review. RMAFC 
emerged as a technical body with capacity for effective monitoring and disbursements of accruals into the FA. 
With a 38-member structure, RMAFC however operates as an unwieldy political body, lacking autonomy and 
capability for achieving its statutory functions 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSION 
The contributions of the non-oil sector, particularly telecommunications, construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
hotel and restaurant services, manufacturing and agriculture, to Nigeria’s economic growth has been tremendous 
over the past decade. In 2012, for instance, non-oil GDP growth was 7.8% down slightly on 2011, with 
agriculture and trade, which together comprised around 75% of the non-oil economy, accounting for the bulk of 
growth (Nigerian Economic Summit Group, 2013:15). Additional drivers of GDP include the 
telecommunications sector, which has seen annual growth rates of more than 30% annually in each of the last 
two years, as well as real estate and construction, respectively. Telecoms, construction, trading and agriculture 
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together accounted for 69% of 2012 output. However, the economic growth has not reduced poverty nor created 
jobs as about two thirds of the population lives on less than 1 US dollar (USD) per day and the unemployment 
rate in 2013 was 27.3%, up from 23.9%, in 2011, despite the fact that government has introduced youth job 
creation initiatives. A major challenge for the economy is the dilapidated state of infrastructure and the over-
dependence on the oil and gas industry. Private sector involvement infrastructure development and in the 
development of the non-oil sector would appear to hold more promise for Nigeria’s economic rejuvenation. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Diversify the economy 
For an economy to be stable and sustainable there has to be a diversification of its sources of revenue. Indeed, 
there are indeed compelling reasons for other export-oriented sectors of the Nigerian economy, especially in the 
agricultural and agro-allied areas to be embraced and addressed to enhance their contributions to the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Economic diversification has a biblical backing. The Bible records that there are 
four rivers that flows into the Garden of Eden. Each of these rivers signifies a resource source, one of which is 
gold (Genesis 2 verse 10-14). Even for an individual, resource flow should ideally not be restricted to only one 
source. For Nigeria, this is the time to pursue the diversification of the economy with a fervent vigour. This 
suggests that some erstwhile moribund but now promising revenue sources like Agriculture, trade, tourism, 
manufacturing, etc must be re-activated and made functional at the three tiers of government.  
Nigeria is richly endowed with natural resources including some 68 million hectares of arable land, 
fresh water sources covering 12 million hectares, 960 kilometres of coastline and a range of ecological belts and 
arable farming lands. This natural and favourable geological setting enables the country to produce a wide 
variety of agricultural and industrial materials which exist in their primary form all over the country. The 
conversion of these raw materials into industrially usable form, through Research and Development (R&D) 
remains the greatest challenge to Nigeria. In diversifying the economy therefore, government should identify and 
prioritise some critical raw materials and adequately fund their development. Government should achieve this 
through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement, while the Raw Materials Research and Development 
Council, which should coordinate this, should be adequately funded. 
 Revamp the Iron and Steel Sector 
A sustainable development of the iron and steel sector is critical to the overall development and industrialisation 
of Nigeria. Indeed, there is an urgent need for industrial revolution in Nigeria. To achieve this, Nigeria is to 
embark on such policy options as resuscitating its institutions/agencies like technical colleges all over the 
country, the moribund Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mill (OSRM), Jos Steel Rolling Mills (JSRM), Katsina Steel 
Rolling Mills (KSRM), Aluminium Smelter Company, National iron ore Mining project, the non-functional 
Ajaokuta Steel Company(ASC), Aladja Steel Complex, etc. Government involvement in the sector is necessary 
because of its capital-intensive nature. A PPP arrangement can also be adopted for revamping the sector.  
 Review the Legislative List for Effective Sub-national Resource Mobilization 
In order to guarantee effective sub-national resource mobilization, there is the need for amendment to certain 
legislations that presently inhibit the states and local governments in terms of resource mobilisation. For instance, 
there is the need for creating legislative enabling environment that will support growth and development of 
private business especially at the grassroots level. Many local governments and states in Nigeria are endowed 
with abundant natural resources but the bulk of these resources are illegally exploited by unknown persons. It is 
important to note that despite the abundant mineral resources in many states of the federation, their exploitation 
is being carried out illegally and in haphazard manner largely because the mining of mineral resources is an item 
on the exclusive legislative list which only the federal government can engage in.  
 Expand Nigeria’s Tax Base 
Nigeria’s tax base remains very narrow, despite promising growth in key states like Lagos. In most developed 
countries, tax revenues are dominant contributor to national treasury. For Nigeria however, the federal Ministry 
of Finance estimates in May 2013 that the country’s Tax-GDP rate stood at roughly 7%, compared to nearly 15% 
for neighbouring economies like Ghana. This suggests that a lot of revenue could still be derived from taxation 
in Nigeria. According to The Nigerian Economic Summit Group, (2013: 36), Federal Inland Revenue service 
(FIRS) lowered Personal Income Tax (PIT) from 25% to 24% in 2013, while leaving the Corporate Income Tax 
(CIT) unchanged at 30%. There is still much to achieve in tax collection in Nigeria. Tourism, for instance, is one 
area where Nigeria can increase revenue generation. Nigeria is endowed with a fair share of tourism potentials 
including cultural festivals and celebrations, historical monuments and museums, natural endowment/man-made 
attractions, and so on. The Nigerian Tourism development Corporation (NTDC), National Council for Arts and 
Culture (NCAC), national Commission for Museums and Monuments (NCMM), and National Tourism Bureau 
should be re-positioned to develop and implement policies on tourism towards enhancing tax revenues from the 
sector. 
The informal sector has the potentials to greatly improve Nigeria’s tax revenues if properly organised. 
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Presently, a large number of informal sector actors are not captured in national accounting, simply because of 
cumbersome registration processes. The sector should be re-organised through a simple registration process 
towards formalising its activities.  
 Tackle Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion has been a constant challenge in Nigeria’s revenue drive as most individuals and corporate 
organizations have the culture of tax evasion. It is estimated that In March 2013 Nigeria had lost some N90 
billion ($567 million) to the grey market in automobiles alone since 2009. To effectively achieve reduction of 
tax evasion, there is a need to run tax education campaigns to sensitise various stakeholders, including traditional 
leaders, clergymen and community leaders to encourage tax compliance within the informal sector. Another 
related suggestion is the outsourcing of tax collection. Lagos state government has as part of its success factors 
the outsourcing of tax collection to private bodies. As a result, the state grew its tax revenue from N7 billion 
($44.1 million) in 2007 to N20 billion ($126 million) in early 2013 with internally generated revenue (IGR) 
contributing 75% of all receipts (The Nigerian Economic Summit Group, 2013: 36). 
Government should institutionalise a number of tax incentives it has started, including the granting of a 
pioneer status to export producing enterprises, provision of tax holiday from income tax up to five years, 
granting a tax credit of 20% of cost for a period of five years to engineering companies which use a minimum of 
60% locally sourced raw materials for production, and so on. 
 Improve Infrastructure 
Massive infrastructural renewal becomes imperative if Nigeria is to achieve its goal of economic diversification 
and improvement in revenue sources. Many small scale enterprises have been forced out of business due to 
exorbitant cost of production as a result of added cost of electricity/power generation. Nigeria governments, 
especially at the federal level need to provide conducive business environment for effective non-oil revenue 
drive. Indeed, government may have to provide basic infrastructural facilities like good roads, electricity, water, 
etc to ensure sustainable development of non-oil sector. Government may consider a reform of the sector just as 
it did to the telecom, communication and power systems. This involves ending government monopoly by 
allowing private firms to bid for the rights to build and or operate under the oversight of a new regulatory 
commission. This same gestures can be extended to pipelines, gas and refineries. When this is done, 
manufacturing will become simultaneously competitive and manufacturing exports would grow.   
 Overcoming the Perverse Incentive of Revenue Sharing 
In Nigeria, revenue sharing constitutes a perverse incentive for effective revenue mobilization and sustainable 
national development. This is in contradistinction with the pre-civil war era when RAS promoted competitive 
federalism, forcing hard work and competition among the Regions. The post-civil war experience has continued 
to promote centralized federalism, with the centre repeatedly creating unviable federating units each of which is 
entitled to free money from the centre. Indeed, virtually all tiers of government in Nigeria, particularly the states 
and local government councils are more preoccupied with sharing of revenue, rather than its mobilization. They 
all largely depend on the federation account as the main source of revenue. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that 
Governments in Nigeria generally have a weak revenue base, a weakness that is more severe at the level of sub 
federal governments. Indeed, sub federal governments in Nigeria seem to have been re-oriented into believing 
that even the federal government itself is a source of revenue which can be exploited through begging, wooing, 
manipulation and even outright deceit (NISER, 2005:6). Internally Generated Revenue (IGR), except for a few 
states such as Lagos and Rivers, is meager and so budget deficits are a common phenomenon not only at the 
federal level but also at the state and local government. One way to overcome this tendency is for revenue 
allocation formula to be redesigned in such a way as to encourage internal revenue generation. It therefore 
becomes imperative that assignment of weight to the principles of horizontal revenue allocation should reflect 
higher weight to internal revenue efforts, and lower allocation to equality of states and population principles. 
Another related issue is the need for fiscal discipline on the part of government at all levels. Budgets are passed 
without details of the government programmes or policies for which the appropriation is made. In the words of 
Daggash (2006:318), the budgets only set out proposals for the mobilization and allocation of funds 
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